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DAVID MILLON*
CRIMINALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW
The Impact on Shareholders and Other
Constituents
THE TITLE FOR THIS PART OF THE PROGRAM IS "The Impact on Shareholders and
Other Constituents," which I take as an opportunity to talk about a subject that has
been of interest to me for a long time. This is the notion that corporate governance
law ought to empower managers to take into account interests of non-shareholders
as well as shareholders. Under this multi-fiduciary model, management owes duties
of a more or less fiduciary nature not just to the shareholders, but to other corpo-
rate constituencies as well.
Having decided to talk about the multi-fiduciary idea, the next challenge is to
think about how corporate criminal law might have some bearing on that topic.
Having never given much thought to corporate criminal law, I am going to say the
answer is not immediately apparent. Today's discussion, though, does suggest that
if corporate criminal liability can penalize shareholders for the sins of corporate
executives, the same point might also be made about non-shareholder constituen-
cies. Harsh sanctions imposed upon the entity can cripple or even destroy a busi-
ness. That will put people out of work, disrupt customer and supplier relations,
and harm local communities reliant on a corporation's presence. This suggests to
me that penalizing the corporate entity is even more problematic than those fo-
cused on shareholder interests realize.
But is there any way that criminalizing corporate law can strengthen the case for
a multi-fiduciary conception of corporate governance? I know that the multi-fidu-
ciary idea has been a hard sell for a long time, and it has actually been a much
harder sell recently than it was when I was doing a lot of writing about it. Since
Enron and the other high-profile corporate scandals,' there has been a heightened
emphasis placed on the interests of shareholders, specifically the need to protect
shareholders and the need to empower shareholders to protect themselves within
the corporate governance structure. Examples include law reform efforts like
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
SI. B. Stomback Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
CRIMINALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW
Sarbanes-Oxley's various provisions,' listing requirements by the New York Stock
Exchange' and the NASDAQ,4 the SEC's proposed rule allowing shareholders to
nominate directors,' and academic discussion like Lucian Bebchuk's arguments
about empowering shareholders to play a more direct role in structuring corporate
governance and even intervening in particular business decisions.' In this world, it
becomes even harder to think about the multi-fiduciary model because that ap-
proach assumes that shareholder interests may, on occasion, have to be sacrificed
for the sake of non-shareholder considerations.
I want to make only a couple of modest suggestions. I think that a regime of
robust criminal sanctions-and here I am talking about sanctioning individuals,
not corporations, because, as I've suggested already, I do have a hard time thinking
about how criminal liability for the corporate entity makes sense-might address a
couple of the most pertinent objections that have been raised to the multi-fiduciary
model.
The first objection is the notion that if management is going to owe duties not
just to shareholders but also to non-shareholder constituencies, you compound the
agency cost problem. The notion is that you cannot serve two masters effectively
or, as Steve Bainbridge put it recently, directors who are accountable "to everyone
are accountable to no one."7 The added space that this expanded discretion creates
can become a cover for efforts by management to extract private benefits through
its use of control.
Criminal penalties, I think, can be helpful here. In theory, criminal penalties for
individual wrongdoing ought to do a good job of punishing and therefore deter-
ring efforts to extract private benefits. Cases like Koslowski's $600 million theft8 or
Fastow's $45 million accounting fraud,9 designed to boost share prices in order to
enhance the value of stock options, should be less likely to occur once there has
been heavy punishment. That would address, at least in part, the concern that serv-
ing multiple masters degrades accountability and facilitates self-dealing.
A second critique of the multi-fiduciary model has to do with management en-
trenchment. For example, in a hostile takeover setting, if the target's management is
empowered to regard not just shareholders but also non-shareholders, that discre-
2. See generally Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (Jul. 30, 2002) (codified as amended at 11, 15 and 18 U.S.C. and other Tides (2006)).
3. See generally N.Y.S.E. Listing Standards, U.S. Standards, available at http://www.nyse.com/regulation/
listed/l 147474807344.html (last visited February 19, 2007).
4. See generally Listing on NASDAQ, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/listing-information.stm
(last visited February 19, 2007).
5. Security Holder Director Nominations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249, 274 (2003).
6. Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L. REV. 833, 835 (2005).
7. Corporate Social Responsibility, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2005/10/cowen.oncsr-pa.html
(Oct, 25, 2005).
8. Levin v. Kozlowski, No. 602113/02, 2006 WL 3317048, at *2-3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 2006).
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tion can provide management seeking to preserve its own position with a pretext
for resisting a takeover that would be attractive to shareholders. The most potent
anti-takeover defense of all, of course, is high share prices, and criminal penalties
for accounting fraud should reduce artificially inflated values. To that extent it
should be harder for management to prevent under-performing companies from
attracting the attention of hostile bidders. A multi-fiduciary conception of the tar-
get board's role may still facilitate resistance, but under-performing managers will
be required to make a case for the firm's continued independence. It will therefore
be that much harder for corrupt, incompetent, or lazy managers to avoid deter-
mined efforts to replace them.
So does criminal law provide a full set of reasons or justifications for a multi-
fiduciary approach to corporate governance? No, not at all. I am saying only that it
can address a couple of important criticisms that have been raised against that
model.
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